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Abstract
Public-key cryptosystems for quantum messages are considered from two
aspects: public-key encryption and public-key authentication. Firstly, we
propose a general construction of quantum public-key encryption scheme, and
then construct an information-theoretic secure instance. Then, we propose a
quantum public-key authentication scheme, which can protect the integrity of
quantum messages. This scheme can both encrypt and authenticate quantum
messages. It is information-theoretic secure with regard to encryption, and
the success probability of tampering decreases exponentially with the security
parameter with regard to authentication. Compared with classical public-key
cryptosystems, one private-key in our schemes corresponds to an exponential
number of public-keys, and every quantum public-key used by the sender is
an unknown quantum state to the sender.
Keywords: Quantum cryptography, authentication, quantum public-key,
private quantum channel
1. Introduction
There are three kinds of cryptosystems for quantum messages, such as
quantum no-key protocol [1, 2], private quantum channel (or quantum one-
time pad) [3, 4, 5], and quantum public-key encryption protocol [6].
∗Corresponding author.
Email address: yangli@iie.ac.cn (Li Yang)
Quantum one-time pad [3, 4] was proposed to encrypt n qubits using
2n-bit secret key. Presharing 2n-bit secret key is sufficient and necessary for
encrypting n-qubit messages with perfect security. Ambainis et al. [5] defined
private quantum channel (PQC), which is actually the same as quantum
one-time pad. PQC (or quantum one-time pad) is a type of symmetric-key
encryption scheme for quantum messages and it is considered to have perfect
security. Later, others [7, 8] relaxed the security requirement of PQC, and
proposed approximate private quantum channel (APQC) (or approximate
randomization of quantum state). This relaxation reduced the length of
preshared classical key.
Leung [9] proposed another kind of quantum one-time pad with preshared
EPR pairs as the secret key. In their scheme, the secret key can be reused
securely. In addition, [10, 11] studied realizable quantum block encryption
algorithm based on some simple bit-wise quantum computation. All these
researches are quantum-message-oriented encryption schemes with preshared
secret key.
Yang [6] constructed the first quantum-message-oriented public-key en-
cryption protocol with classical private- key and classical public-key. It is
a computationally secure quantum public-key encryption protocol. Kawachi
and Portmann [12] presented another kind of quantum-message-oriented public-
key encryption protocol, where the public-key is the quantum state. By an-
alyzing the protocol from the message size and the number of copies of the
quantum public-key, they showed that it is bounded information-theoretic
secure.
In this paper, we propose a quantum-message-oriented public-key encryp-
tion protocol, where one private-key corresponds to an exponential number
of quantum public-keys and any two public-keys are different. In this scheme,
the quantum public-keys are unknown to the sender, and the sender can only
use them. The scheme has been proved to be truly information-theoretic se-
cure.
Quantum authentication scheme (QAS) was firstly defined by Barnum
et al. [13]. They showed that any scheme to authenticate quantum mes-
sages must also encrypt them, and constructed a quantum-message-oriented
symmetric-key authentication scheme with preshared classical key. Their
scheme can both encrypt and authenticate n-qubit message. If encrypting
and authenticating n-qubit message into n+q qubits, the sender and receiver
need to preshare 2n+O(q)-bit classical key, where q is the security parameter.
Later, [14, 15] constructed a quantum-message-oriented public-key authen-
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tication scheme without a preshared classical key. However, its security is
based on computational assumptions. Zhang [16] proposed another type of
QAS to authenticate the identity of the users, which will not be studied in
this paper.
We propose a quantum-message-oriented public-key authentication scheme
with the public-keys being quantum states. It can both encrypt and authen-
ticate quantum messages. It is information-theoretic secure with regard to
encryption, and the success probability of tampering decreases exponentially
with the security parameter with regard to authentication.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Private quantum channel [5]
Ambainis et al. [5] defined PQC with an ancillary quantum state. Here
we use the PQC without ancillary qubits. The definition is as follows.
Definition 1: PQC is a set {pi, Ui|i = 1, 2, ..., 2
2n}, where
∑22n
i=1 pi = 1,
pi is the probability of using the classical key i. The PQC is used in the
following way: Alice and Bob preshare a classical secret key i, then
1. Alice uses the unitary transformation Ui to encrypt a n-qubit message
σ, and obtains its quantum cipher σ′ = UiσU
†
i . Alice sends σ
′ to Bob.
2. Bob uses the unitary transformation U †i to decrypt σ
′, and obtains the
message σ = U †i σ
′Ui.
In order to be secure, it is required that the following formula holds for any
n-qubit state σ: ∑
i∈{0,1}2n
piUiσU
†
i = σ0, ∀σ, (1)
where σ0 is a fixed state which is independent of σ (For example σ0 =
1
2n
I).
PQC is a symmetric-key cryptosystem using a preshared classical key.
Denote PQCl(σ) as using 2n-bit classical key l ∈ {0, 1}
2n to encrypt n-qubit
message σ through PQC, and its quantum cipher is denoted as l(σ). For
example, [3, 4] proposed a PQC {pα,β =
1
22n
, Uα,β = X
αZβ|α, β ∈ {0, 1}n}.
Its encryption transformation is
l(σ) = PQCl(σ) = UlσU
†
l
=
(
⊗nj=1X
lj
)
·
(
⊗2nj=n+1Z
lj
)
σ
(
⊗2nj=n+1Z
lj
)
·
(
⊗nj=1X
lj
)
. (2)
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The PQC decryption transformation is
PQC−1l (σ) = U
†
l σUl
=
(
⊗2nj=n+1Z
lj
)
·
(
⊗nj=1X
lj
)
σ
(
⊗nj=1X
lj
)
·
(
⊗2nj=n+1Z
lj
)
. (3)
Other researchers [7, 8] studied the approximate quantum encryption or
approximate PQC (APQC). In APQC, the security condition Eq.(1) is re-
laxed in order to lessen the preshared secret key. It is required that
D

 ∑
i∈{0,1}m
piUiσU
†
i , σ0

 ≤ ǫ, (4)
where σ is any n-qubit message, m is the length of the preshared key, and
m < 2n. D(ρ1, ρ2) =
1
2
tr|ρ1−ρ2| represents the trace distance of two density
matrixes ρ1 and ρ2 [17]. ǫ is security parameter, and APQC is considered a
perfect PQC when ǫ = 0.
We denote APQCl(σ) as usingm-bit preshared key l ∈ {0, 1}
m to encrypt
n-qubit message σ through APQC. For example, we can adopt the last scheme
(hybrid construction) in [8]. That scheme is described as follows. Let B be
a δ-biased set on n bits. For b ∈ B, define a unitary transformation Ub as
follows. Define Ub|x〉 = (−1)
b·x|x〉, ∀x ∈ {0, 1}n, where b · x is the usual
(bitwise) inner product of b and x. Each a ∈ {0, 1}n and b ∈ B are selected
with uniform probability. The APQC transformation can be described as
follows:
APQC(σ) =
1
2n
·
1
|B|
∑
a∈{0,1}n
∑
b∈B
APQCa,b(σ), (5)
where APQCa,b(σ) represents using the preshared classical key a||b to encrypt
quantum message σ (”||” denotes an concatenation of two bit-strings).
APQCa,b(σ) = X
aZa
2
UbσU
†
bZ
−a2X−a, (6)
where Xa = Xa1 ⊗· · ·⊗Xan , X−a = (Xa)† and a ∈ {0, 1}n, b ∈ B ⊂ {0, 1}n.
The total length of a and b is n + n = 2n. Because B is a δ-biased set on
n bits, n′ = log|B| + O(1) bits of randomness is enough to generate any
n-bit number b ∈ B in polynomial time [8]. In other words, the set B can
be generated from the set {0, 1}n
′
using a polynomial-time algorithm. For
convenience, each number b ∈ B can be seen as one element of the set {0, 1}n
′
.
Thus, this APQC construction needs only m = n + n′ bits of the classical
key, and m = n+ log|B|+O(1) < 2n.
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2.2. Quantum authentication scheme [13]
Authentication of quantum messages was defined by Barnum et al. [13].
A sender Alice and a receiver Bob must preshare a classical key k ∈ K. Alice
and Bob use k to authenticate the quantum message.
Definition 2: QAS is defined by a triplet (A,D,K), where A and D are
two polynomial-time quantum algorithms, and K is a set of classical keys.
(A,D,K) satisfies:
1. Alice performs quantum algorithm A on a n-qubit message σ and a
classical key k ∈ K, and outputs a n + t-qubit state σ′. Alice sends σ′
to Bob.
2. Bob receives a quantum state σ′, and then inputs σ′ and the classical
key k ∈ K to quantum algorithm D. The output of D has two parts:
a n-qubit message σ, a single-qubit |v〉. Bob decides to accept or reject
according to the single-qubit |v〉 (accept if it is |1〉 and reject if it is
|0〉).
From this definition, QAS is a type of symmetric-key authentication for
quantum messages. However, we will consider public-key authentication of
quantum messages in this paper.
3. Security notion
In this section, information-theoretic security is defined for public-key
encryption of quantum messages, and two sufficient conditions are presented
here.
Lemma 1: HC is a quantum state space. The following two statements
are equivalent:
(1) There exists a fixed quantum state τ , such that D(ρ, τ) ≤ ǫ, ∀ρ ∈ HC .
(2) D(ρ1, ρ2) ≤ ǫ, ∀ρ1, ρ2 ∈ HC .
Proof: Firstly, the statement (2) can be deduced from (1). ∀ρ1, ρ2 ∈ HC ,
D(ρ1, ρ2) =
1
2
tr|ρ1 − ρ2|
=
1
2
tr|ρ1 − τ + τ − ρ2|
≤
1
2
tr|ρ1 − τ |+
1
2
tr|τ − ρ2|
= D(ρ1, τ) +D(ρ2, τ)
≤ ǫ+ ǫ = 2ǫ.
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It is straightforward to deduce (1) from (2). By randomly selecting a
fixed quantum state τ from HC , then τ can satisfy the condition D(ρ, τ) ≤
ǫ, ∀ρ ∈ HC . 
From Definition 5.2.4 in [18], indistinguishability was defined for public-
key encryption of the classical messages.
Definition 3: A public-key encryption scheme for the classical messages
has indistinguishable encryptions, if for every classical polynomial-size circuit
family {Cn}, and every positive polynomial p(·), all sufficiently large n, and
every x, y ∈ {0, 1}poly(n)(i.e.,|x| = |y| = n),
∣∣Pr[Cn(G(1n), EG(1n)(x)) = 1]− Pr[Cn(G(1n), EG(1n)(y)) = 1]∣∣ < 1
p(n)
,
(7)
where the algorithm E is a classical encryption algorithm and G is a algo-
rithm for key generation.
From the discussion in Chapter 5.5.2 in [18], the security can be clas-
sified according to the size of classical circuit family {Cn}: (1) if {Cn} is
polynomial-size, the above definition defines computational security; (2) if
there are no limitations on the size of {Cn}, the above definition defines
information-theoretic security.
Definition 3 in [19] defines information-theoretic security of quantum
public-key encryption for classical messages. It naturally extends the information-
theoretic security of classical public-key encryption. It coincides with the
notion of information-theoretically indistinguishable as discussed by Hayashi
et al. [20]. Here, it is extended to information-theoretic security of quantum
public-key encryption for quantum messages. Two sufficient conditions are
presented here.
Definition 4: A quantum public-key encryption scheme for quantum
messages is information-theoretic secure, if for every quantum circuit family
{Cn}, every positive polynomial p(.), all sufficiently large n, and any two
quantum messages σ, σ′ ∈ HM , it holds that∣∣Pr[Cn(G(1n), EG(1n)(σ)) = 1]− Pr[Cn(G(1n), EG(1n)(σ′)) = 1]∣∣ < 1
p(n)
,
(8)
where the algorithm E is a quantum algorithm for encryption and G is a
quantum algorithm for generating public-keys.
It should be noted that Yang et al. [19] and in this paper, information-
theoretic security are all defined using quantum circuit family {Cn} without
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limitations on its size. This means {Cn} can be any quantum circuit fam-
ily of arbitrary size. Here, the right side of Eq.(8) is 1
p(n)
, but it does not
mean that the ciphers can be distinguished efficiently, because p(n) is not a
particular polynomial but an arbitrary polynomial. Thus the above defini-
tion means, for any two quantum messages, their quantum ciphers cannot be
distinguished by any quantum circuit family of any size.
Next, two sufficient conditions are presented. The sender Alice encrypts
a quantum message σ ∈ HM using a quantum public-key ρk, k ∈ K. Its
quantum cipher is denoted as ρ
(σ)
k . Suppose each quantum public-key ρk, k ∈
K is used with probability pk, and
∑
k∈K pk = 1. The attacker Eve does not
know the public-key used by Alice, so the quantum cipher (with respect to
Eve) of σ can be represented by
∑
k pkρ
(σ)
k .
Theorem 1: A quantum public-key encryption scheme (E,G) for quan-
tum messages is information-theoretic secure, if for every positive polynomial
p(.), all sufficiently large n, any two quantum messages σ, σ′ ∈ HM ,
D
(∑
k
pkρ
(σ)
k ,
∑
k
pkρ
(σ′)
k
)
<
1
p(n)
, (9)
where ρ
(σ)
k and ρ
(σ′)
k are quantum ciphers of σ and σ
′ using quantum en-
cryption algorithm E and public-key ρk, respectively. We consider pk as the
probability of generating public-key ρk from the quantum algorithm G, and∑
k∈K pk = 1.
Proof: In Definition 4, E is a quantum encryption algorithm which per-
forms on quantum message σ, and G is a quantum algorithm for generating
public-keys, and each public-key ρk is generated with a probability pk, so
Pr
[
Cn
(
G(1n), EG(1n)(σ)
)
= 1
]
=
∑
k
pkPr
[
Cn
(
ρ
(σ)
k ⊗ σa
)
= 1
]
= Pr
[
Cn
(∑
k
pkρ
(σ)
k ⊗ σa
)
= 1
]
,
where σa is a quantum state which acts as ancillary input to quantum circuit
Cn.
Similarly, the following formula can be deduced.
Pr
[
Cn
(
G(1n), EG(1n)(σ
′)
)
= 1
]
= Pr[Cn(
∑
k
pkρ
(σ′)
k ⊗ σa) = 1].
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Any quantum circuit family {Cn} built for distinguishing two density
operators corresponds to a set of positive operator-values measure (POVM)
{Em}. We define pm = tr
(
Cn
(∑
k pkρ
(σ)
k ⊗ σa
)
Em
)
and
qm = tr
(
Cn
(∑
k pkρ
(σ′)
k ⊗ σa
)
Em
)
as the probabilities of measurement re-
sult labeled by m. In this case, we have∣∣∣∣∣Pr
[
Cn
(∑
k
pkρ
(σ)
k ⊗ σa
)
= 1
]
− Pr
[
Cn
(∑
k
pkρ
(σ′)
k ⊗ σa
)
= 1
]∣∣∣∣∣
≤ max
{Em}
1
2
∑
m
∣∣∣∣∣tr
[(
Cn
(∑
k
pkρ
(σ)
k ⊗ σa
)
− Cn
(∑
k
pkρ
(σ′)
k ⊗ σa
))
Em
]∣∣∣∣∣
= max
{Em}
D(pm, qm). (10)
The formula Eq.(10) is equal to
D
(
Cn
(∑
k
pkρ
(σ)
k ⊗ σa
)
, Cn
(∑
k
pkρ
(σ′)
k ⊗ σa
))
≤ D
(∑
k
pkρ
(σ)
k ⊗ σa,
∑
k
pkρ
(σ′)
k ⊗ σa
)
= D
(∑
k
pkρ
(σ)
k ,
∑
k
pkρ
(σ′)
k
)
<
1
p(n)
. (11)
Then,∣∣Pr[Cn(G(1n), EG(1n)(σ)) = 1]− Pr[Cn(G(1n), EG(1n)(σ′)) = 1]∣∣ < 1
p(n)
.
Thus, the quantum public-key encryption scheme (E,G) is information-
theoretic secure. 
From Lemma 1 and Theorem 1, the following corollary can be deduced
directly.
Corollary 1: A quantum public-key encryption scheme (E,G) for quan-
tum messages is information-theoretic secure, if for every positive polynomial
p(.), all sufficiently large n, there exists a fixed quantum states τ such that
D
(∑
k
pkρ
(σ)
k , τ
)
<
1
p(n)
, ∀σ ∈ HM , (12)
8
where ρ
(σ)
k is the cipher of quantum message σ using the quantum encryption
algorithm E and the public-key ρk. Again, we consider pk as the probability
of generating public-key ρk from the quantum algorithm G, and
∑
k∈K pk = 1.
4. Public-key encryption of quantum information
4.1. A general construction
Firstly, we define a model for quantum public-key encryption of classical
messages [22].
Definition 5: A public-key cryptosystem using quantum public-key to
encrypt classical messages is described by a quadruple [22]:
∆ =
(
{Fi}i∈I , {(s, ρk)}s∈{0,1}O(n), E ,D
)
,
where all components are defined as follows.
1. {Fi}i∈I is a set of private-keys. Each Fi is a polynomial-time com-
putable function with O(n)-bit input and n-bit output. (Fi : {0, 1}
O(n) →
{0, 1}n).
2. {(s, ρk)}s∈{0,1}O(n) is a set of quantum public-keys. Each pair of (s, k) is
generated from a function F ∈ {Fi}i∈I , and their relation is k = F (s).
Given k, quantum state ρk can be efficiently prepared.
3. E is a quantum encryption transformation. Alice uses E and quan-
tum public-key (s, ρk) to encrypt the classical message l, and obtains
a quantum cipher ρ
(l)
k = E(ρk, l). Alice sends (s, ρ
(l)
k ) to Bob.
4. D is a quantum decryption transformation. After receiving (s, ρ
(l)
k ) from
Alice, Bob computes k = F (s) by using private-key F ∈ {Fi}. Bob
then uses D and k to decrypt the cipher ρ
(l)
k , and obtains the classical
message l = D(ρ
(l)
k , k).
In this definition, the private-key F is a function which can be computed
efficiently. From the key F , many different pairs of (s, k) can be generated
such that F (s) = k, thereby allowing many different quantum public-keys
to be prepared. Thus, the relation between private-keys and public-keys is
one-to-many. That means, a private-key F corresponds to many quantum
public-keys (s, ρk), where F (s) = k.
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In the encryption schemes introduced in [21, 12], the relation between
private-keys and public-keys is one-to-one (One private-key k corresponds to
one quantum public-key ρk). This kind of schema is a special case of the
public-key cryptosystem ∆. The reason is as follows. In ∆, let s ≡ 0, then
k ≡ F (0), so k is uniquely determined by F . Then the public-key (0, ρk) is
uniquely determined by private-key F .
Remark 1: Because the attacker Eve does not know the function F , she
does not know the value of k. Suppose each k is used with probability pk,
then the cipher of classical message l (with respect to Eve) is
∑
k pkρ
(l)
k .
PQC is a symmetric-key encryption scheme for quantum messages with
classical secret key. ∆ is a public-key encryption scheme for classical messages
with quantum public-keys. The two schemes are combined as Figure 1, and
form a public-key encryption scheme for quantum messages with quantum
public-keys.
RNG
PQC
∆
σ
),(
k
s ρ ),( )(l
k
s ρ
)(σ
l
l
Figure 1: Public-key encryption scheme for quantum messages with quantum public-
keys. RNG is a random number generator. ∆ is a public-key encryption scheme for
classical messages with quantum public-keys. PQC is a symmetric-key encryption scheme
for quantum messages with classical secret key. RNG generates a random number l, then
l is used as an encryption key in PQC, and acts as a classical message in ∆. (s, ρk) is a
quantum public-key in ∆. Quantum state σ is a message being encrypted by the PQC.
Next, we describe the scheme in detail. Bob generates a private-key F
and many quantum public-keys, then he sends all quantum public-keys to
his public-key register. The progress is as follows.
[Key Generation]
1. Bob randomly selects a function F ∈ {Fi}i∈I ;
2. Bob randomly selects some sj ∈ {0, 1}
O(n), and computes kj = F (sj),
and then prepares quantum state ρkj according to kj;
3. Bob uploads all (sj , ρkj) to his public-key register. The function F is
Bob’s private-key.
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Alice intends to send a n-qubit message σ to Bob. She firstly downloads
quantum public-keys from Bob’s public-key register, then encrypts σ with
quantum public-keys. The progress is as follows.
[Encryption]
1. Alice randomly selects a 2n-bit number l, and then encrypts the quan-
tum message σ by performing PQC encryption transformation l(σ) =
PQCl(σ);
2. Alice downloads quantum public-key (s, ρk) ∈ {(sj, ρkj)}j from Bob’s
public-key register, and then encrypts l by performing encryption trans-
formation E , and obtains ρ
(l)
k = E(ρk, l);
3. Alice sends s and the quantum cipher ρ
(l)
k ⊗ l
(σ) to Bob.
Bob receives the cipher (s, ρ
(l)
k ⊗ l
(σ)), and then decrypts it as follows.
[Decryption]
1. According to the value of s, Bob uses his private-key F to compute
k = F (s);
2. According to the value of k, Bob performs decryption transformation
D on quantum cipher ρ
(l)
k , and obtains l = D(ρ
(l)
k , k);
3. According to the value of l, Bob performs PQC decryption transfor-
mation on quantum cipher l(σ), and obtains the quantum message
σ = PQC−1l (l
(σ)).
In this scheme, l is a random number selected by Alice, and is unknown
by Eve. From Remark 1, the cipher of the quantum message σ (with respect
to Eve) can be represented as follows.
G(σ) =
1
22n
∑
l∈{0,1}2n
[∑
k
pkρ
(l)
k
]
⊗ l(σ). (13)
This scheme is constructed by combining a public-key encryption scheme
∆ and a symmetric-key encryption scheme PQC (or APQC). The security of
the combined scheme can be determined by the security of ∆ and PQC (or
APQC). The analysis is as follows.
Lemma 2: In a quantum state space HC , if there exists a fixed state τ ,
such that D(ρ, τ) ≤ ǫ, ∀ρ ∈ HC , then D
(∑
k∈K pkρk, τ
)
≤ ǫ, where ρk ∈ HC
and
∑
k∈K pk = 1.
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Proof: From
∑
k∈K pk = 1, it can be deduced that
D
(∑
k
pkρk, τ
)
=
1
2
tr
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k
pkρk − τ
∣∣∣∣∣ = 12tr
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
k
pk(ρk − τ)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
1
2
tr
∑
k
pk |ρk − τ | =
∑
k
pkD(ρk, τ)
≤
∑
k
pkǫ = ǫ. 
Theorem 2: If there exists a scheme ∆ and a PQC (APQC), which
satisfy the following conditions:
1. For the scheme ∆, there exist a fixed state τ1, such that
D
(∑
k
pkρ
(l)
k , τ1
)
≤ ǫ1, ∀l;
2. For the PQC (APQC), there exist a fixed state τ2, such that
D
(
1
22n
∑
l∈{0,1}2n l
(σ), τ2
)
≤ ǫ2, ∀σ;
then there exists a fixed state τ , such that D (G(σ), τ) ≤ ǫ1 + ǫ2, ∀σ.
Proof: From the condition 1, ∀l, σ
D
([∑
k
pkρ
(l)
k
]
⊗ l(σ), τ1 ⊗ l
(σ)
)
= D
(∑
k
pkρ
(l)
k , τ1
)
≤ ǫ1.
According to Lemma 2, it can be deduced that
D

G(σ), 1
22n
∑
l∈{0,1}2n
τ1 ⊗ l
(σ)

 ≤ ǫ1, ∀σ. (14)
Then there exists a state τ = τ1 ⊗ τ2, such that
D (G(σ), τ) = D (G(σ), τ1 ⊗ τ2)
≤ D
(
G(σ),
1
22n
∑
l
τ1 ⊗ l
(σ)
)
+D
(
1
22n
∑
l
τ1 ⊗ l
(σ), τ1 ⊗ τ2
)
≤ ǫ1 +D
(
1
22n
∑
l
l(σ), τ2
)
≤ ǫ1 + ǫ2. 
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4.2. Quantum public-key encryption of classical information[22]
In order to give a concrete example for the scheme described in Figure 1,
we firstly introduce an example for public-key encryption scheme ∆. This
example was proposed by Pan and Yang [22]. Their scheme can be used
to encrypt single-bit classical message with information-theoretic security.
Moreover, Yang et al. [23] proposed a classical message oriented quantum
public-key scheme based on conjugate coding. This scheme is another exam-
ple of ∆.
Denote Ωn = {k ∈ {0, 1}
n|there has odd number of ′1′ in k}. Define a
n-qubit state ρk,i =
1
2
(|i〉 + |i⊕ k〉)(〈i| + 〈i⊕ k|), where i ∈ {0, 1}n, k ∈ Ωn.
Let Vl = (⊗
n
j=1Z)
l, l ∈ {0, 1}, then it is the identity transformation I while
l = 0, and it is the unitary transformation ⊗nj=1Z while l = 1. We define a
transformation as follows:
T : l → Vlρk,iV
†
l , l ∈ {0, 1}. (15)
Denote ρ
(l)
k,i = T (l) = Vlρk,iV
†
l , then ρ
(0)
k,i = ρk,i. Because k ∈ Ωn, it can be
deduced that ρ
(1)
k,i = (⊗
n
j=1Z)ρk,i(⊗
n
j=1Z)
† = 1
2
(|i〉 − |i⊕ k〉)(〈i| − 〈i⊕ k|).
According to Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 in [22], if the values of k and i are
unknown, it is information-theoretically indistinguishable between
1
22n−1
∑
k∈Ωn
∑
i∈{0,1}n
ρ
(0)
k,i and
1
22n−1
∑
k∈Ωn
∑
i∈{0,1}n
ρ
(1)
k,i (the trace distance of them is
1
2n−1
). However, given the value of k, there exists a polynomial-time quantum
algorithm which can distinguish 1
2n
∑
i∈{0,1}n
ρ
(0)
k,i and
1
2n
∑
i∈{0,1}n
ρ
(1)
k,i . Therefore,
T is a quantum trapdoor one-way transformation with trapdoor k.
The key generation process is as follows.
1. Bob randomly selects an efficiently computable function F : {0, 1}O(n) →
{0, 1}n;
2. Bob randomly selects a number s ∈ {0, 1}O(n), and then computes a
n-bit number k = F (s). Then he continues the next step if k is an
element of Ωn, otherwise he randomly selects a new number s;
3. Bob randomly selects a number i ∈ {0, 1}n, and prepares a n-qubit
state ρk,i =
1
2
(|i〉+ |i⊕ k〉)(〈i|+ 〈i⊕ k|);
4. Bob’s public-key is (s, ρk,i), and private-key is F .
Alice uses Bob’s public-key to encrypt one classical bit l ∈ {0, 1}. Its
encryption transformation is as follows.
ρ
(l)
k,i = E(ρk,i, l) = Vlρk,iV
†
l . (16)
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That means, Alice performs a unitary transformation Vl = (⊗
n
j=1Z)
l on Bob’s
public-key (s, ρk,i), and then sends its result (s, ρ
(l)
k,i) to Bob.
After receiving the cipher (s, ρ
(l)
k,i), Bob uses his private-key F to decrypts
as follows. He firstly computes k = F (s) from the value of s, and then
decrypts ρ
(l)
k,i with its trapdoor k, and obtains the classical message l.
Remark 2: In this example, the public-key is (s, ρk,i). Compared with
the encryption scheme ∆ defined in Section 4.1, here a random parameter
i is added into the public-key in order to protect k (See the analysis in
Section 4.4).
4.3. Quantum public-key encryption of quantum information
According to the general construction in Section 4.1, and the example
of ∆ as introduced in Section 4.2, we can construct a concrete public-key
encryption protocol for quantum message. The encryption key l of PQC has
2n bits, and the scheme in Section 4.2 is used to encrypt single-bit classical
message, so that the 2n bits should be encrypted one by one.
Alice intends to encrypt a 2n-bit number l, thus she must get Bob’s
quantum public-keys. There are two requirements for the quantum public-
keys: (1) In order to protect k, all the quantum public-keys are different
(See the proof of Proposition 1); (2) In order to encrypt 2n bits, she needs
to get 2n quantum public-keys (From the scheme in Section 4.2, Alice stores
single-bit message in a quantum public-key, and then sends the quantum
public-key to Bob. However, she does not know the state of the quantum
public-key, and cannot produce its copies according to quantum no-cloning
theorem. Thus, if she has only one copy of Bob’s public-key, she can only
encrypt one bit). From the two requirements, Alice must get 2n different
quantum public-keys published by Bob. We denote the 2n quantum public-
keys as (sj, ρkj ,ij), j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}, and the j-th bit (j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}) of l is lj .
Alice encrypts each bit lj, and obtains a quantum cipher ρ
(lj)
kj ,ij
= E(ρkj ,ij , lj).
If Alice intends to send a n-qubit message σ to Bob securely, she firstly
downloads 2n quantum public-keys: (sj, ρkj ,ij), j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n} from Bob’s
public-key register. Let ρki = (ρk1,i1, · · · , ρk2n,i2n). The encryption process is
as follows.
[Encryption]
1. Alice randomly selects a 2n-bit number l = (l1, . . . , l2n) ∈ {0, 1}
2n;
2. Alice encrypts the quantum message σ with PQC encryption transfor-
mation and the classical key l, and obtains l(σ) = PQCl(σ);
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3. Alice uses Bob’s public-key (sj, ρkj ,ij ) to encrypt each bit lj(j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n}),
and obtains 2n2 qubits
ρ
(l)
ki = E
′(ρki, l) ≡ ⊗
2n
j=1E(ρkj ,ij , lj) ≡ ⊗
2n
j=1ρ
(lj)
kj ,ij
;
4. Alice sends all the 2n strings s1, . . . , s2n and quantum cipher ρ
(l)
ki ⊗ l
(σ)
to Bob.
Bob receives these classical numbers s1, . . . , s2n and the quantum cipher
ρ
(l)
ki ⊗ l
(σ), and then performs the decryption process.
[Decryption]
1. According to s1, . . . , s2n, Bob uses his private-key F to compute kj =
F (sj), j ∈ {1, . . . , 2n};
2. Bob uses k1, . . . , k2n to decrypt the first 2n
2-qubit of the quantum ci-
pher. He decrypts ⊗2nj=1ρ
(lj)
kj ,ij
and obtains each bit of l: lj = D(ρ
(lj)
kj ,ij
, kj), j ∈
{1, · · · , 2n};
3. According to l, Bob decrypts quantum cipher l(σ) by performing PQC
decryption transformation, and obtains the quantum message σ =
PQC−1l (l
(σ)).
The attacker Eve does not know the random string l and the quantum
public-keys used by Alice. Thus, with respect to Eve, a n-qubit state σ is
encrypted into a 2n2 + n-qubit state
G(σ) =
1
22n
∑
l∈{0,1}2n


(
1
22n−1
)2n ∑
k1,··· ,k2n∈Ωn,
i1,··· ,i2n∈{0,1}n
E ′(ρki, l)

⊗ PQCl(σ)
=
1
22n
∑
l∈{0,1}2n
⊗2nj=1

 1
22n−1
∑
kj∈Ωn
∑
ij∈{0,1}n
ρ
(lj)
kj ,ij

⊗ PQCl(σ), (17)
where E ′(ρki, l) ≡ ⊗
2n
j=1E(ρkj ,ij , lj), ρki ≡ (ρk1,i1, · · · , ρk2n,i2n).
In the above scheme, PQC encryption needs 2n-bit classical number l. If
we consider to replace PQC with APQC (replace the transformation PQCl(σ)
with APQCl(σ) in the above protocol), the length of l can be reduced. This
method can save quantum resources while encrypting classical string l.
For example, we consider the case that, the PQC in Figure 1 is re-
placed with the APQC which is described in Eq.(6). Then APQCl(σ) =
15
APQCa,b(σ), where l = a||b is an m-bit string. Thus, encrypting a n-qubit
message σ can obtain a nm+n-qubit cipher. The cipher with respect to Eve
is
G ′(σ) =
1
2m
∑
l∈{0,1}m


(
1
22n−1
)m ∑
k1,··· ,km∈Ωn,
i1,··· ,im∈{0,1}n
[
⊗mj=1E(ρkj ,ij , lj)
]

⊗ APQCl(σ)
=
1
2m
∑
l∈{0,1}m
⊗mj=1

 1
22n−1
∑
kj∈Ωn
∑
ij∈{0,1}n
ρ
(lj)
kj ,ij

⊗ APQCl(σ). (18)
From m < 2n, it can be infered that n(m + 1) < 2n2 + n. That means the
cipher of a n-qubit state is shortened.
4.4. Security analysis
The security of the quantum public-key encryption scheme proposed in
Section 4.3 is analyzed from two aspects: (1) the security of private-key; (2)
the security of encryption.
Firstly, we consider the security of private-key. In this scheme, k is an
important number because it can be directly used for decryption. Accord-
ing to the Holevo theorem [17], at most n-bit classical information can be
obtained from a n-qubit public-key
ρk,i =
1
2
(|i〉+ |i⊕ k〉)(〈i|+ 〈i⊕ k|), ∀i ∈ {0, 1}n, k ∈ Ωn.
If Eve receives enough copies of a public-key (s, ρk,i), she can obtain the
n-bit information of k, and then attack the communication between Alice
and Bob. Thus, in order to protect the communication, the copies of each
quantum public-key must be limited by an upper bound λ. That means Bob
publishes at most λ copies of the quantum public-key (s, ρk,i) according to a
pair of (s, i), and then selects a new pair of (s, i) to produce new quantum
public-key. The following proposition proves that the upper bound λ is equal
to 1.
Proposition 1: Given c ≥ 2 copies of a quantum public-key (s, ρk,i), the
value of k can be extracted successfully with probability at least 1
2
.
Proof: For arbitrary quantum public-key, suppose the n-qubit state is
ρk,i =
1
2
(|i〉 + |i ⊕ k〉)(〈i| + 〈i ⊕ k|), where i ∈ {0, 1}n and k ∈ Ωn. Suppose
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Eve has received sufficient copies of ρk,i. Firstly, she measures the first copy
of ρk,i in the basis {|0〉, |1〉}, and gets a n-bit string r1. Then she measures
the second copy of ρk,i and gets the second string r2. If r1 = r2, she continues
to measure the t-th (t = 3, 4, · · · ) copy of ρk,i, until the t-th string rt 6= r1.
At this time, she can conclude k = r1 ⊕ rt.
We denote random variable N as the measurement times until k being
determined. The probability of the number k being determined until the t-th
measurement is
Pr(N = t) =
1
2t−1
, t ≥ 2.
Thus expected value of N is
+∞∑
t=2
t · Pr(N = t) =
+∞∑
t=2
t
2t−1
= 3.
That means, measurement for three times in average can determine the value
of k. Moreover, Pr(N = 2) = 1
2
, which means the successful probability is 1
2
when there are two copies of ρk,i. 
According to Proposition 1, in order to protect k, only one copy of each
quantum public-key (s, ρk,i) is permitted to be produced from a pair of (s, i).
Therefore, any two quantum public-keys published by Bob are different. The
attacker Eve can only obtain one copy of ρk,i. When she measures it, she
will get i and i⊕ k both with probability 1
2
, but cannot get both the values
of i and i ⊕ k. Extracting the value of k from i or i ⊕ k is the same as
attacking one-time-pad in classical cryptography. Therefore, extracting the
value of k from only one copy of (s, ρk,i) is information-theoretically impossi-
ble. Moreover, extracting the relation (the private-key F ) between s and k is
also information-theoretically impossible. There maybe exist some different
quantum public-keys corresponding to the same k, such as ρk,i1, . . . , ρk,it. In
this case, Theorem 6 in [22] has proved that it is still information-theoretic
secure if t = o(n).
In the scheme proposed in [12], one private-key corresponds to only one
quantum public-key, but one quantum public-key can be published by many
copies. In order to prevent the attacker to extract private-key from suf-
ficiently more copies of quantum public-key, the number of the published
copies must be limited. This scheme can only be used to encrypt very lim-
ited number of qubits. While in our scheme, one private-key corresponds
to an exponential number of quantum public-keys, and any two quantum
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public-keys are different. Each quantum public-key can be used to encrypt
one bit using the protocol proposed in Section 4.2, and two bits can be used
to encrypt one qubit using PQC. Thus, the combined scheme can be used to
encrypt an exponential number of qubits.
Next, we analyze the security from the second aspect. We prove the
scheme in Section 4.3 is information-theoretic secure.
Lemma 3: D(ρ1⊗ρ2, ρ
′
1⊗ρ
′
2) ≤ D(ρ1, ρ
′
1)+D(ρ2, ρ
′
2), where ρ1, ρ
′
1, ρ2, ρ
′
2
are any four density matrixes.
Proof: For any density matrix ρ, it is positive semidefinite and its trace
is equal to 1. Thus, tr|ρ| = tr(ρ) = 1.
D(ρ1 ⊗ ρ2, ρ
′
1 ⊗ ρ
′
2)
=
1
2
tr|ρ1 ⊗ ρ2 − ρ
′
1 ⊗ ρ
′
2|
=
1
2
tr|ρ1 ⊗ ρ2 − ρ1 ⊗ ρ
′
2 + ρ1 ⊗ ρ
′
2 − ρ
′
1 ⊗ ρ
′
2|
≤
1
2
tr|ρ1 ⊗ (ρ2 − ρ
′
2)|+
1
2
tr|(ρ1 − ρ
′
1)⊗ ρ
′
2|
=
1
2
tr|ρ1| · tr|ρ2 − ρ
′
2|+
1
2
tr|ρ1 − ρ
′
1| · tr|ρ
′
2|
=
1
2
tr|ρ2 − ρ
′
2|+
1
2
tr|ρ1 − ρ
′
1|
= D(ρ1, ρ
′
1) +D(ρ2, ρ
′
2). 
Proposition 2: There exists a fixed quantum state τ , such thatD(G(σ), τ) ≤
n
2n−2
, ∀σ.
Proof: According to Lemma 4 in [22], it can be inferred that ∀j ∈
{1, · · · , 2n},
D

 1
22n−1
∑
kj∈Ωn
∑
ij∈{0,1}n
E(ρkj ,ij , lj),
1
22n−1
∑
kj∈Ωn
∑
ij∈{0,1}n
E(ρkj ,ij , lj ⊕ 1)

 = 1
2n−1
.
(19)
From Lemma 3, it can be known that ∀l, l′ ∈ {0, 1}2n,
D
(
1
22n(2n−1)
∑
k,i
E ′(ρki, l),
1
22n(2n−1)
∑
k,i
E ′(ρki, l
′)
)
≤ 2n ·
1
2n−1
=
n
2n−2
, (20)
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where the notation
∑
k,i
represents
∑
k1,··· ,k2n
∑
i1,··· ,i2n
and ρki = (ρk1,i1, · · · , ρk2n,i2n).
From Lemma 1, ∃τ1, such that
D
(
1
22n(2n−1)
∑
k,i
E ′(ρki, l), τ1
)
≤ ǫ1 =
n
2n−2
, ∀l ∈ {0, 1}2n. (21)
According to the definition of PQC, there exists a fixed quantum state
τ2, which satisfies
D

 1
22n
∑
l∈{0,1}2n
PQCl(σ), τ2

 ≤ ǫ2 = 0, ∀σ. (22)
Then, from Theorem 2, ∃τ = τ1 ⊗ τ2, such that
D (G(σ), τ) ≤ ǫ1 + ǫ2 =
n
2n−2
. 
According to Proposition 2 and Corollary 1, the public-key encryption
scheme proposed in Section 4.3 is information-theoretic secure.
Finally, we study the security of the public-key encryption scheme when
its PQC module is replaced with an APQC. Suppose APQC satisfies a con-
dition: there exists a fixed quantum state τ2, such that for any positive
polynomial p(n), and all sufficiently large n, it holds that
D

 1
2m
∑
l∈{0,1}m
APQCl(σ), τ2

 ≤ ǫ2 = 1
p(n)
, ∀σ. (23)
We will show the modified scheme is still information-theoretic secure.
Proposition 3: If the PQC is replaced with an APQC satisfying the
condition Eq.(23), there exists a fixed quantum state τ , such that for any
positive polynomial p(n), and all sufficiently large n, D(G ′(σ), τ) ≤ 1
p(n)
, ∀σ.
Proof: This proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2. Because the
length of l is m < 2n in the modified scheme, the right formula of Eq.(20)
should be modified to be the expression ”≤ m
2n−1
< n
2n−2
”. Therefore,
D
(
1
2m(2n−1)
∑
k,i
E ′(ρki, l), τ1
)
< ǫ1 =
n
2n−2
, ∀l ∈ {0, 1}m. (24)
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Because APQC satisfies the condition Eq.(23) and according to Theorem 2,
there exists a state τ = τ1 ⊗ τ2, such that for any positive polynomial p(n),
and all sufficiently large n, it holds that D(G ′(σ), τ) < ǫ1 + ǫ2 =
n
2n−2
+ 1
p(n)
.
Therefore the proposition is proved. 
It can be inferred from Proposition 3 and Corollary 1 that, the modified
scheme is still information-theoretic secure when APQC satisfies the condi-
tion Eq.(23).
5. Public-key authentication of quantum information
5.1. A general construction
Barnum et al. [13] proposed a symmetric-key authentication of quan-
tum messages. In their scheme, Alice and Bob must preshare some classical
bit-strings. We will construct an asymmetric-key authentication scheme for
quantum messages, where the public-key is quantum state.
In a symmetric-key authentication of quantum messages, the authenti-
cation transformation is denoted as u(σ) = Au(σ), where σ is a quantum
message, u is a classical parameter for authentication. See [13] for a concrete
instance of this type.
In a quantum public-key encryption of classical messages (for example ∆
in Section 4.1), the encryption transformation is denoted as ρ
(u)
k = E(ρk, u),
where u is a classical bit-string to be encrypted, and ρk is a quantum public-
key.
A general public-key authentication of quantum messages is described as
follows.
1. Alice randomly selects a classical bit-string u, and then performs the
authentication transformation on the quantum message σ, and obtains
a quantum state u(σ) = Au(σ);
2. Alice uses Bob’s quantum public-key ρk to encrypt u, and obtains a
quantum cipher ρ
(u)
k = E(ρk, u);
3. Alice sends ρ
(u)
k and u
(σ) to Bob;
4. Bob receives the quantum state ρ
(u)
k ⊗u
(σ), and then decrypts ρ
(u)
k using
his private-key F , and obtains the classical string u;
5. According to u, Bob authenticates u(σ) and recovers the message. If
authentication succeeds, he can get the untampered quantum message
σ.
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5.2. Symmetric-key authentication of quantum information [13]
Barnum et al. [13] defined authentication of quantum messages, and
showed that any scheme to authenticate quantum messages must also encrypt
them. They also constructed a non-interactive symmetric-key authentication
scheme with inherent encryption. In their scheme, a stabilizer purity testing
code (SPTC) {Qz}, z ∈ K is used for authentication. Alice and Bob must
preshare three random strings z, x, y.
Next, we describe their authentication scheme briefly. We denote Ex(σ)
as its encryption transformation which encrypts quantum message σ with
classical key x, and denote its decryption transformation asDx(∗). The secret
key x is used in both encryption and decryption processes. (For example,
the PQC can be used here.)
Alice intends to send a quantum message σ to Bob. The authentication
process is as follows.
1. Alice encrypts the quantum message σ using the key x, and obtains
x(σ) = Ex(σ);
2. By using z and y, Alice encodes x(σ) for the code Qz with syndrome y
to produce u(σ), where u = x||z||y; Alice sends u(σ) to Bob;
3. Bob receives u(σ
′), and measures the syndrome y′ of the code Qz on
this quantum state. Then he compares y to y′, and aborts if y 6=
y′; otherwise, it can be inferred that u(σ
′) = u(σ), and the next step
continues;
4. Bob decodes u(σ) according to Qz, and obtains x
(σ). Bob decrypts x(σ)
using x, and obtains the quantum message σ = Dx(x
(σ)).
5.3. Quantum public-key authentication of quantum information
According to the general construction in Section 5.1, a public-key authen-
tication scheme for quantum messages can be constructed by combining a
quantum public-key encryption scheme ∆ with the authentication scheme as
in Section 5.2. Here, the scheme introduced in Section 4.2 is selected as the
quantum public-key encryption scheme ∆, and the PQC is selected as the
encryption module of the authentication scheme as in Section 5.2.
Next, we present the quantum public-key authentication scheme in de-
tail. We denote Qz,y(σ) as encoding σ for the code Qz with syndrome y.
Let u = x||z||y, the authentication transformation is Au(σ) = Ax,z,y(σ) =
Qz,y(PQCx(σ)).
The SPTC {Qz}(z ∈ K) is public. Alice authenticates a n-qubit state σ
as follows.
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1. Alice randomly selects three parameters x, z, y, where x ∈ {0, 1}2n, z ∈
K, y ∈ S, and S is a set of correctable syndromes. Suppose the total
length of the three parameters is h;
2. According to u (or x||z||y), Alice performs authentication transforma-
tion on σ, and obtains u(σ) = Au(σ) = Qz,y(PQCx(σ));
3. Alice uses Bob’s quantum public-keys (sj, ρkj ,ij ), j = 1, . . . , h to en-
crypt the classical bit-string u ≡ (u1, . . . , uh), and obtains ρ
(uj)
kj ,ij
=
E(ρkj ,ij , uj), j = 1, . . . , h;
4. Alice sends s1, · · · , sh and ⊗
h
j=1ρ
(uj)
kj ,ij
⊗ u(σ) to Bob.
Bob uses his private-key F to authenticate the integrity of quantum mes-
sages as follows.
1. Bob uses his private-key F to decrypt ρ
(uj)
kj ,ij
, j = 1, . . . , h, and obtains
u (here u = x||z||y);
2. According to the authentication process in Section 5.2, Bob uses u to
authenticate u(σ) (or Qz,y(PQCx(σ))).
From Section 4.2, Bob’s quantum public-key is (s, ρki), where s = (s1, · · · , sh)
and ρki = (ρk1,i1, . . . , ρkh,ih). Alice uses Bob’s public-key (s, ρki) to encrypt
the parameter u = x||z||y. The encryption transformation can be repre-
sented as E ′(ρki, u) = ⊗
h
j=1E(ρkj ,ij , uj). Thus, the public-key authentication
transformation on the quantum message σ using the quantum public-key ρki
can be represented as
A(ρki, σ) = E
′(ρki, x||z||y)⊗Qz,y (PQCx(σ)) , (25)
where x ∈ {0, 1}2n, z ∈ K, y ∈ S. The total length of the three parameters is
h = 2n+ log|K|+ log|S|. Because the public-key and the random parameters
x||z||y are unknown to Eve, the state obtained after public-key authentication
(with respect to Eve) is
F(σ) =
∑
x,z,y
px,z,y
(
1
2h(2n−1)
∑
k,i
E ′(ρki, x||z||y)⊗Qz,y (PQCx(σ))
)
, (26)
where px,z,y = pxpypz is the probability of selecting x||z||y, and the encryption
transformation E ′ is the same as introduced in Section 4.3. The notation
∑
k,i
represents
∑
k1,··· ,kh
∑
i1,··· ,ih
.
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If the PQC in the above scheme is replaced with APQC, the public-key
authentication transformation on the quantum message σ using the quantum
public-key ρki is represented as
A′(ρki, σ) = E
′(ρki, x||z||y)⊗Qz,y (APQCx(σ)) , (27)
where x ∈ {0, 1}m, z ∈ K, y ∈ S. The total length of the three parameters
is h′ = m + log|K| + log|S|. With respect to Eve, the state obtained after
public-key authentication is
F ′(σ) =
∑
x,z,y
px,z,y
(
1
2h′(2n−1)
∑
k,i
E ′(ρki, x||z||y)⊗Qz,y (APQCx(σ))
)
, (28)
where
∑
k,i
represents
∑
k1,··· ,kh′
∑
i1,··· ,ih′
. The only difference between Eq.(28) and
Eq.(26) is that PQCx(σ) has been replaced with APQCx(σ) and the total
length of parameters x||z||y decreases to h′ from h.
5.4. Security analysis
Barnum et al. [13] showed that any scheme to authenticate quantum
messages must also encrypt them. The public-key authentication scheme
proposed in Section 5.3 has inherent encryption. Thus, the security must be
considered from two aspects: (1) analyzing the security of authentication;
(2) analyzing the security of encryption. In this authentication scheme, the
authentication module is just the symmetric-key authentication scheme pro-
posed in [13], which has the error probability (or the success probability of
tampering) decreasing exponentially with the security parameter (See The-
orem 4 in [13]). Therefore, while our scheme being used for authentication,
the error probability decreases exponentially with the security parameter.
Thus, we only need to consider its security with regard to encryption.
Proposition 4: There exists a fixed quantum state τ , such that
D(F(σ), τ) ≤ h
2n−1
, ∀σ, where h = 2n+ log|K|+ log|S|.
Proof: ∀σ∑
u
puAu(σ) =
∑
x,z,y
px,z,yQz,y(PQCx(σ))
=
∑
z,y
pzpyQz,y
(∑
x
pxPQCx(σ)
)
=
∑
z,y
pzpyQz,y(σ0), (29)
23
where σ0 is a fixed state. Thus, there exists a fixed quantum state τ2 =∑
z,y pzpyQz,y(σ0), such that
D(
∑
u
puAu(σ), τ2) ≤ ǫ2 = 0. (30)
According to the way to deduce Eq.(21), there exists a fixed state τ1, such
that
D
(
1
2h(2n−1)
∑
k,i
E ′(ρki, x||z||y), τ1
)
≤ ǫ1 =
h
2n−1
, ∀x, z, y, (31)
where h is the total length of x, z, y. According to Theorem 2, there exists a
fixed state τ = τ1 ⊗ τ2, such that D(F(σ), τ) ≤ ǫ1 + ǫ2 =
h
2n−1
. 
It can be inferred from Proposition 4 and Corollary 1 that, the public-key
authentication scheme is information-theoretic secure with regard to encryp-
tion.
Remark 3: The public-key authentication scheme proposed in Sec-
tion 5.3 is analyzed with regard to encryption. This scheme can be seen
as a combined construction of an encryption transformation E ′ for the clas-
sical string u = x||z||y and an encryption (or authentication) transformation
Au(∗) for quantum message σ, so the result of Theorem 2 can also be used
while analyzing its security with regard to encryption.
Next, we consider the security of modified public-key authentication scheme,
where PQC is replaced with APQC.
Proposition 5: Suppose APQC satisfies the condition: there exists a
fixed quantum state σ0, such that for any n-qubit state σ,
D

 ∑
x∈{0,1}m
pxAPQCx(σ), σ0

 ≤ ǫ.
Then, there exists a fixed state σ1, such that
D
(∑
u
puA
′
u(σ), σ1
)
≤ ǫ, ∀σ, (32)
where A′u(σ) = Qz,y(APQCx(σ)), u = x||z||y.
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Proof: The encoding transformation Qz,y(·) is linear, so∑
u
puA
′
u(σ) =
∑
x,z,y
px,z,yQz,y(APQCx(σ))
=
∑
z,y
pzpyQz,y
(∑
x
pxAPQCx(σ)
)
. (33)
Qz,y(·) is a quantum transformation for encoding, and does not change the
trace distance of any two states. Therefore, there exists a fixed state σ1 =∑
z,y pzpyQz,y(σ0), such that
D
(∑
u
puA
′
u(σ), σ1
)
≤
∑
z,y
pzpyD
(
Qz,y
(∑
x
pxAPQCx(σ)
)
, Qz,y (σ0)
)
=
∑
z,y
pzpyD
(∑
x
pxAPQCx(σ), σ0
)
≤ ǫ. 
Suppose APQC satisfies a condition: there exists a fixed quantum state
σ0, such that for every positive polynomial p(n) and all sufficiently large n,
D
(∑
x
pxAPQCx(σ), σ0
)
≤
1
p(n)
, ∀σ. (34)
Proposition 6: Suppose an APQC satisfying the condition Eq.(34) is
used in the modified public-key authentication scheme, then there exists a
fixed quantum state τ , such that for every positive polynomial p′(n) and all
sufficiently large n, it has D(F ′(σ), τ) ≤ 1
p′(n)
, ∀σ.
Proof: Because the APQC satisfies the condition Eq.(34), it can be
inferred from Proposition 5 that there exists a fixed state τ2, such that for
every positive polynomial p(n) and all sufficiently large n, then it holds that
D
(∑
u
puA
′
u(σ), τ2
)
≤ ǫ2 =
1
p(n)
, ∀σ. (35)
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Similar to the deduction of Eq.(31), there exists a state τ1, such that
D
(
1
2h′(2n−1)
∑
k,i
E ′(ρki, x||z||y), τ1
)
≤ ǫ1 =
h′
2n−1
, ∀x, z, y.
According to Theorem 2, there exists a state τ = τ1⊗ τ2, such that for every
positive polynomial p′(n) and all sufficiently large n, then it holds that
D(F ′(σ), τ) ≤ ǫ1 + ǫ2 =
h′
2n−1
+
1
p(n)
≤
1
p′(n)
, ∀σ. 
According to Proposition 6 and Corollary 1, if the APQC satisfies the
condition Eq.(34), the modified public-key authentication scheme is still
information-theoretic secure with regard to encryption.
6. Discussion
The public-key encryption scheme proposed in Section 4.1 is different from
classical public-key encryption. Here, the public-keys are quantum states
and are unknown to the sender Alice. Alice uses the quantum public-keys
without knowing their concrete states. It is also different from the public-key
encryption scheme proposed in [12], because one private-key corresponds to
an exponential number of quantum public-keys here. However, in [12] one
private-key corresponds to only one public-key.
The quantum public-key encryption scheme suggested by Kawachi and
Portmann [12] is bounded information-theoretic secure. However, our scheme
is truly information-theoretic secure. The reason is as follows. In [12], each
quantum public-key can be used O(n) times (strictly, each quantum public-
key can have O(n) copies, and each copy can be used one time), and can
encrypt n qubits each time, so each quantum public-key can be used to
encrypt only O(n2) qubits. Moreover, one private-key corresponds to only
one public-key in the scheme, so each private-key can only be used to protect
O(n2) qubits. Therefore, the scheme is bounded information-theoretic secure.
In our quantum public-key encryption scheme, a function F is used as private-
key. An exponential-size set generated from F is denoted as R = {(k, i)|i ∈
{0, 1}n, k = F (s) ∈ Ωn, s ∈ {0, 1}
O(n)}, where |R| = O(2n). From each
element (k, i) of R, a quantum state ρk,i can be produced. Thus, one private-
key F corresponds to O(2n) quantum public-keys. Moreover, each quantum
public-key can be used only once, and can encrypt O(1) qubits, so each
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private-key F can be used to protect O(2n) qubits. Therefore, our scheme is
truly information-theoretic secure.
In the general construction as shown in Figure 1, the classical number l is
encrypted using a type of quantum public-key scheme ∆, then Alice and Bob
can securely communicate without a preshared secret key. In order to con-
struct an encryption scheme of quantum message without a preshared key,
there are another two choices to replace the module ∆: (1) quantum secure
direct communication (QSDC)[24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29]; (2) quantum asymmet-
ric cryptosystem proposed in [30]. The security needs further analysis for
these choices.
Barnum et al. [13] proposed a public-key authentication scheme for quan-
tum messages. In the scheme, the sender uses classical cryptosystem to en-
crypt and sign the parameters x, z, y, and obtains classical cipher, and then
sends it and the authenticated state of σ. Because all the classical public-key
cryptosystoms are based on computationally hard problems and are com-
putational secure, thus the authentication scheme is computational secure.
However, in the quantum public-key authentication scheme in Section 5.3,
the classical parameters x, z, y are encrypted using a quantum public-key
encryption scheme, which is information-theoretic secure.
Since lacking of digital signature, our authentication scheme cannot pre-
vent Eve from substituting the quantum messages sent by Alice. It can
only prevent quantum messages from being tampered. Thus, the scheme can
protect the integrity of quantum messages.
In both the public-key encryption and authentication scheme, it is always
assumed that the quantum public-keys are distributed securely. This paper
concentrates on the study of the algorithm of quantum public-key cryptosys-
tems, and does not study the management of quantum public-keys. However,
the management of quantum public-keys is a critical problem which needs to
be addressed, such as quantum public key infrastructure (QPKI).
7. Conclusions
This paper studies public-key cryptosystems using quantum public-keys.
Firstly, we define information-theoretic security for public-key encryption of
quantum message, and give two sufficient conditions for information-theoretic
security. Secondly, we define a model of quantum public-key encryption of
the classical messages. Based on this, a general construction is proposed for
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quantum public-key encryption of quantum message. Then a concrete ex-
ample is presented and is proved to be information-theoretic secure. Finally,
we propose a general construction for public-key authentication, which can
protect the integrity of the quantum messages. We also suggests a concrete
example of quantum public-key authentication. The example is proved to
be information-theoretic secure with regard to encryption, and the success
probability of tampering decreases exponentially with the security parameter
with regard to authentication.
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